THE FTC HAS A DOG IN THE PATENT MONOPOLY
FIGHT: WILL ANTITRUST’S BITE KILL GENERIC
CHALLENGES?
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ABSTRACT
Antitrust laws have been notoriously lenient in the patent
realm, the underlying reason being that patents’ grant of exclusion
create monopolies that defy antitrust laws in order to incentivize
innovation. Thus, antitrust violations have rarely been found in the
patent cases. But after the Supreme Court’s holding in FTC v.
Actavis, brand name pharmaceutical companies may need to be
more cautious when settling Hatch-Waxman litigation with
potential patent infringers. Both brand-name drug manufacturers
and generic drug manufacturers have incentives to settle cases by
having the brand-name pay the generic in exchange for delaying
their entry into the market. While courts usually found that these
reverse-payment settlements did not violate antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court recently held that they sometimes can, even if the
settlement’s anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent. The Court tried to take the
middle ground after rejecting several bright line rules promulgated
by appellate courts, including the Third Circuit’s “quick look”
presumption against reverse payment settlements and the Second,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test. This
note finds that the Supreme Court’s ruling will make the HatchWaxman legal landscape murky and, therefore, difficult for district
courts to rule on the legality of reverse-payment settlements in the
future. The ruling may hinder generics from challenging brandname manufacturers, a result that would certainly contravene the
principle purpose behind the Hatch Waxman Act.

INTRODUCTION
The battle between antitrust and patent affects everyone, though it
is not readily apparent. Take the regular drug store visit to pick up a
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remedy for any common ailment, for example. When looking for a pain
reliever, does one choose Advil® or the store’s generic brand based on the
same chemical compound, ibuprofen? For itchy watery eyes, does one
choose Clartin® or any drug with the active ingredient loratadine? What
makes a customer choose one over the other? Surely, we are swayed
somewhat by brand loyalty, the attractive packaging, and advertisements,
but mostly, it all boils down to the price seen on the shelves.
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act1 in order to prescribe
special procedures for identifying and resolving patent disputes between
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.2 The Hatch-Waxman Act was
designed to further drug competition by promoting the availability of lowcost generic drugs through expedited introduction to the market.3 Under the
Act, generic manufacturers must simply show that their drug has the “same
active ingredients as” and is “biologically equivalent” to the already
approved brand-name drug4 in order to bypass the lengthy and expensive
clinical trials and FDA approval process for a new drug.5 This Act reflects
the careful balance between properly creating incentives for innovation and
providing value to consumers. The patent system rewards brand-name
manufacturers with a patent for the considerable funds they invest in
research and development, their resultant inventions, and the creation of a
beneficial drug for society, but limits the amount of time the brand-name
manufacturer can have a monopoly in order to allow cost-effective generics
to enter the market and provide lower healthcare costs for consumers.
The enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act created an unintended
by-product: reverse payment settlements,6 or pay-to-delay settlements,
between brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.7 Reverse payment
1

Officially, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.
See H.R. Rep. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–17 (1984) (discussing the need to change
how the drug patent process works).
3
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
4
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2012)).
5
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (allowing
applicants to use “bioequivalence” in lieu of conducting animal and human studies
when introducing a new drug).
6
The term “reverse” refers to the fact that the patent holder is paying the alleged
infringer, rather than vice versa. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). Reverse payments are also sometimes referred to as “payfor-delay agreements,” “exclusion payments,” or “brand payments.”
7
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY FOR DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 3 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delayhow-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commissionstaff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
2
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settlements are agreements under which the brand-name manufacturer pays
a rival generic manufacturer to delay their market entry.8 Such agreements
have created tension between antitrust law and patent law and have spurred
many heated debates about their legality.9 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has asserted that “‘[p]ay-for-delay’ agreements are ‘win-win’ for the
companies: brand-name pharmaceutical prices stay high, and the brand and
generic share the benefits of the brand’s monopoly profits,” but consumers
will “miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent less than
brand prices.”10 Even Congress has recognized this issue and has made
several modest attempts at rectifying this loophole.11 However, some courts
have allowed reverse payments as long as the exclusion of generics falls
within the patent’s scope, meaning that the settlement does not keep the
generic drug off the market past the brand name’s patent expiration.12
Recently, the Third Circuit declined to follow this approach and applied a
presumption against any settlement involving delayed entry into the market,
creating a split between the circuits.13
Because of the circuit split and Congress’s failure to act, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the reverse payment settlement

8

See id. at 1.
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1555–56 (2006)
(summarizing the “stark” conflict between the means of antitrust law and those of
patent law).
10
FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
11
See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995,
112th Cong. (2012) (proposed bill that would have prohibited pay-for-delay
agreements).
12
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing holdings of several circuit courts that allowed reverse
payments as long as the exclusion of generics fell within the patent’s scope). Under
the “scope of the patent” test, reverse payment settlements are deemed permissible
so long as (1) they do not exceed the scope of a patent, (2) the patent holder's patent
infringement claim was not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not
procured by fraud. See id.
13
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug
Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013) and cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013)
reinstatement granted, No. 2-01-cv-01652, 2013 WL 5180857 (3d Cir. Sept. 9,
2013). The Third Circuit employed the stricter “quick look” rule of reason analysis
to find that “any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who
agrees to delay entry into the market [is] prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint of trade.” Id.
9
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issue in FTC v. Actavis.14 The Supreme Court found a middle ground,
holding that reverse payments were not presumptively illegal, but that
reverse payment settlements in patent infringement litigation could
sometimes violate the antitrust laws—even if the agreement’s
anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent.15 The Supreme Court also outlined a standard comprised of
considerations for allowing antitrust law analysis to determine if a reverse
payment settlement is illegal.
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v.
Actavis and how lower courts should apply the Supreme Court’s standard
by examining patent and antitrust law principles and the history of reverse
payment settlements. Part I delivers a background on reverse payment
settlements, including the circuit split on the legality of reverse payment
settlements and the viewpoints of the FTC and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on the illegality of reverse payment settlements. Part II provides a
detailed analysis of the judicial standards adopted by the Supreme Court
and the strengths and weakness of that approach. Part II also addresses the
procedural complications of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Part III analyzes
the public policy implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Part IV offers
proposed solutions to help mitigate any negative effects from the ruling,
including how lower courts should apply the Supreme Court’s ruling and
legislative reform.

I. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the pioneer brand-name drug
manufacturer to list the “number and the expiration date” of any relevant
patent in its New Drug Application (NDA),16 and it requires the generic
drug manufacturer to assure the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that
the generic will not infringe the brand-name's patents in its Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA).17 The generic manufacturer can provide
this assurance by requesting approval to market beginning when any still-inforce patents expire, certifying that the brand-name manufacturer has not
listed any relevant patents or that any relevant patents have expired.18
14

F.T.C. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). The case was formally
known as FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals. The case name changed because
generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. had since changed its
name to Actavis.
15
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
16
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (discussing what needs to be included in an
application for a new drug).
17
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
18
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
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Alternatively, the generic manufacturer can also seek Paragraph IV19
certification by claiming that any listed or relevant patent “is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the drug described in
the ANDA.20 A Paragraph IV challenge would automatically count as
patent infringement under the statute21 and often “means provoking
litigation.”22
Further, the Act encourages generic manufactures to take the
Paragraph IV route by giving the first-to-file company 180 days of generic
exclusivity starting from the first commercial marketing of its drug.23
Because no other generic drugs can be marketed during the exclusivity
period, the generic manufacturer’s potential profits mostly materialize
during this period and can be worth several hundred million dollars.24 The
Act also incentivizes the brand-name drug manufacturer to respond to the
generic’s Paragraph IV certification by providing an automatic stay of FDA
approval of the ANDA for 30 months if the brand-name files a patent
infringement lawsuit.25 The brand-name drug manufacturer is also
motivated to challenge Paragraph IV certification because of its patent and,
more importantly, its profits have been put at risk.
The Hatch-Waxman Act unintentionally created an incentive
structure for brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug
manufacturers to settle patent infringement claims through reverse
payments, where the brand-name manufacturer pays the generic
manufacturer to delay a generic’s market entry.26 Because of the significant
difference between monopoly and competitive drug prices, both
manufacturers are encouraged to settle litigation through reverse payments
in the current landscape.27 Generic manufacturer profits are much less than
what brand-name manufacturers stand to lose, which allows brand-name
manufacturers to settle litigation by offering generic manufacturers a split of
the monopoly profits—an offer that ends up costing more money than what
the generic manufacturer would have made by entering the market.28 Both
the FTC and DOJ, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies, have
steadfastly maintained that reverse payments are a violation of antitrust laws
19

Because it stems from the fourth paragraph of this statute’s section, this type of
challenge is commonly known as the “Paragraph IV” route, which requires the
generic drug manufacture to certify that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug.
20
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
21
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
22
Caraco Pharm. Labs, 132 S. Ct. at 1677.
23
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
24
Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1579.
25
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
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as the settlement extends the patent holder’s monopoly.29 Furthermore, the
agencies argue that the delay of generic drugs produces a negative
economic impact on pharmaceutical drug consumers due to the monopoly
pricing set by the brand-name drug manufacturers.30 Nevertheless, courts
have generally found that reverse payment settlements do not violate
antitrust laws so long as they do not extend the brand-name’s monopoly
past patent expiration.31 By contrast, the Third and Sixth Circuits have
adopted a vastly different approach and found reverse payment settlements
to be presumptively illegal.32 While Congress could resolve this by
26

See FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data
and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 635–36
(2009) (discussing the drug manufacturer’s incentive to settle).
28
Id.
29
See FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2; Confirmation Hearings
on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 618 (2009) (statement of Christine Varney, nominee for Assistant Att’y
Gen., Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice) (stating DOJ’s full
support of the FTC’s position against reverse payment settlements).
30
Consumers will “miss out on generic prices that can be as much as 90 percent
less than brand prices” and “[p]ay-for-delay agreements have significantly
postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic drug prices.” FTC, PAY
FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2.
31
See, generally, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that absent sham litigation or fraud in
obtaining patent, reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within scope of exclusionary potential of
patent); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that
brand-name manufacturer acted within its rights as patentee when it agreed to make
payments to generic manufacturers in exchange for an agreement not to market
generic version of drug until patent expired); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (requiring patent holder to make reverse payments to generic drug
manufacturer in a settlement agreement would not be unlawful under Sherman Act
even if it required reverse payments in an amount more than either party anticipated
generic manufacturer would earn by winning lawsuit); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that brand-name
manufacturer’s agreements with generics manufacturers to not market generic
version until patents expired or were held invalid, in exchange for cash payments,
was not a per se violation of Sherman Act prohibition on contracts in restraint of
trade).
32
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the
rule of reason test to find the reverse payment agreement at issue per se illegal); In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (same).
27
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amending the Hatch-Waxman Act, they have yet to pass any legislative
solutions.
In order to better understand how the reverse payment system was
created, section A will outline the incentives that Congress provided
generics in the Hatch-Waxman Act. To understand why reverse payments
arrive at such disparate analysis by the courts, section B will analyze the
clash between antitrust law and patent law and section C details the FTC’s
and DOJ’s view that started the litigation in the first place. Section D will
analyze the circuit split and the two main tests employed by the courts
before Actavis, which caused tension as to whether a settlement was
allowed under patent law and antitrust law.

A. The Creation of Reverse Payment Settlements
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must function within the framework
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.33 In order for a
pharmaceutical drug to be approved by the FDA, the manufacturer must
submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which demands a multitude of
information on the drug’s safety, efficacy, and method of production, and
disclosure of any patents related to its composition or methods of use.34
This is an extensive, time-consuming review process that requires
significant development costs and intensive, multi-phase clinical trial
testing.35 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug manufacturer
could not legally develop a generic version of a brand-name drug until the
patent expired.36 Furthermore, once the patent expired, the generic drug
would have to obtain FDA approval through the same extensive NDA
process.37 The duplicative nature of this process eroded the incentives for
manufacturers to develop generics.38
33

21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (describing what must be contained in application to
introduce a new drug into interstate commerce).
35
WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30756,
PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION
ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 20 (2005).
36
See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006)), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff'd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
37
SCHACT & THOMAS, supra note 35, at 20.
38
See id. (noting that generic drug manufactures would have to undertake
significant costs to get generic drugs on the market).
34
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1. Congress’s Incentive Structure to Promote Generics.
In order to promote the research and development of competing
drugs, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, giving generic drug
manufacturers three major incentives: the safe-harbor provision, the ANDA,
and the 180-day exclusivity period.39 The safe-harbor provision under Title
II of the Act allows manufactures to use the patented invention “solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information”
to the FDA without infringing the patent.40 This allows the generic drug
manufacturer to conduct testing to establish bioequivalency—the same
active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, etc.—
before the patent expires so that the generic can be launched quickly after
the patent’s expiration.41 The second benefit under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
ANDA, allows generic manufacturers who establish bioequivalency to rely
on, or “piggyback,”42 the FDA’s finding of safety and efficacy for that
drug.43 By not having to go through the costly and time-consuming NDA
approval process, the manufacturer’s initial investment into developing a
generic drug decreases dramatically.44
Finally, generic manufacturers have an incentive to challenge the
brand-name drug’s patents45 in order to receive exclusivity against other
competing drugs from entering the market for 180 days46 with minimal
risk.47 Known as the “Paragraph IV” route,48 the first-to-file ANDA
39

FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 3. The Hatch-Waxman Act was
passed as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c,
70b (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271, 282 (2006)).
40
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
41
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2692 (“[T]he only activity which will be permitted by the bill is a limited amount of
testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a generic
substitute. The patent holder retains the right to exclude others from the major
commercial marketplace during the life of the patent. Thus, the nature of the
interference with the rights of the patent holder is not substantial.”).
42
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003).
43
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
44
See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 617–18 (2011) (estimating the cost of
preparing and filing an ANDA to be $1 million).
45
See id.
46
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I).
47
As long as the generic manufacturer does not market the product, it will face
minimal liability for infringement because there generally are no damages if the
product was never sold. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic
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applicant certifies that any listed, relevant patent “is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug.49 Once
initiated, the patent owner has forty-five days to initiate infringement
litigation and if the patent owner fails to respond, the ANDA applicant can
market the drug without infringing on the underlying patent.50
2. 180-day Exclusivity Period: A Perverse Incentive.
While the Hatch-Waxman Act theoretically created notable
incentives for greater production of generic drugs, the 180-day exclusivity
period eventually pushed both the generic manufacturer and brand-name
manufacturer to settle using reverse payments. The exclusivity period
drives the generic manufacturer because the exclusivity period begins after
the first-to-file generic manufacturer markets the drug or after a court finds
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.51 The brand-name manufacturer is
spurred to settle because the grant of exclusivity does not expire.52 This
means that the reverse payment settlement scheme not only delays the firstto-file generic manufacturer’s entry into the market, but also prevents any
other generic manufacturer from entering the market until after the patent
expires unless they go through the FDA’s NDA process, which is cost
prohibitive.53 Other generic manufacturers could also file a subsequent
Paragraph IV challenge, but this rarely, if ever, happens. The secondcomers have little incentive to file a subsequent Paragraph IV challenge
without a grant of exclusivity as a possible reward because of the high cost
and risk associated with patent litigation.
The brand-name manufacturers settle litigation by offering the firstto-file generic manufacturer significant monetary compensation, more than
the profitability of generics and less than the loss of the brand-name’s
market share, in exchange for the generic to delay entry into the market and
Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 264 (2012).
48
This is referred to as the “Paragraph IV” route because it falls under the fourth
paragraph of the relevant statutory section, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)
(2012). Alternatively, the ANDA applicant can file under paragraphs I-III, where
the applicant certifies that the brand-name manufacturer failed to file the relevant
patents, the patents expired, or approval is being sought effective on a date after
patent expiration. See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III) (2012).
49
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
50
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), (j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I) (2012); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) (2012).
51
21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5) (2012).
52
See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1755 (2003).
53
See id.
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to “park” its grant of 180-day exclusivity.54 In the end, this incentive causes
a brand-name manufacturer to settle only with a generic manufacturer that
has been approved for the 180-day exclusivity period because the first-tofile generic can exercise its exclusivity period whenever they want.

B. The Clash Between Patent Law and Antitrust Law
The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) prohibits businesses
from contracting, combining, and conspiring to restrain trade or commerce
to encourage competitive markets and promote consumer welfare.55 On the
other hand, a patent grants “the right to exclude others from profiting by the
patented invention”56 and is an exception to the general rule against
monopolies and to the right of access to a free and open market.57 Patents
therefore grant patent holders a time-limited monopoly without fear of
antitrust liabilities.58
The Sherman Act prohibits only “unreasonable restraints on
competition” under the rule of reason standard, whereby the company’s
behavior is analyzed under an “elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness” in
context of a particular industry.59 Because the rule of reason standard is not
a bright-line rule and consumes considerable time and resources to litigate,
the Supreme Court has ruled certain agreements per se illegal under the
Sherman Act.60 These standards have been imported into how the circuit
courts decided antitrust violations in the Hatch-Waxman context by creating
the “scope of the patent” test and “quick look” rule of reason test explained
in section D.
In the patent law realm, a patent is presumptively valid and the
burden of proving invalidity rests on the challenging party.61 In the HatchWaxman context, the generic manufacturer filing the ANDA must show
54

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (proscribing all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade).
56
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
57
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
58
See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) (“It is only when
[the patentee] . . . steps out of the scope of his patent rights . . . that he comes within
the operation of the [Sherman] Act.”).
59
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing United
States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
60
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that “there are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).
61
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
55
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that the brand-name patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence.62
Therefore, implications related to the enforcement of antitrust laws only
apply when the settlement of Hatch-Waxman litigation falls outside of the
rights granted by the patent or when the patent is invalid. Because of the
major difference between the two spheres of law, it is possible that antitrust
laws might not provide the most suitable vehicle for policing reverse
payment agreements.

C. FTC and DOJ’s Stance on Reverse Payment Settlements
The FTC has long been aware of reverse payment settlements and
always opposed their potential to be over-extended, but it was not until
recently that the FTC was concerned with the anticompetitive implications
of reverse payments.63 Insisting that “[p]ay-for-delay agreements have
significantly postponed substantial consumer savings from lower generic
drug prices[,]” the agency has strenuously opposed pay-to-delay deals as
anticompetitive and ultimately harmful for US consumers.64 The FTC has
equated reverse payment agreements with horizontal market allocation
agreements, which are ordinarily per se antitrust violations when no patent
is involved.65 Therefore, the FTC views reverse payment settlements as
presumptively illegal.
The FTC has said that any exemption from antitrust law that patent
settlements receive normally do not apply if the patent is invalid or does not
cover the restricted activities.66 The FTC has demonstrated its skepticism
regarding the presumption of patent validity, stating a firm “certain that a
patent was valid . . . would have no incentive whatsoever to pay another
62

Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) aff’d, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
63
Reverse payment settlement agreement in the Hatch-Waxman context is not a
new phenomenon. For example, the FTC Generic Drug Study identifies one that
was executed in March 1993, and there were probably prior reverse payment
settlements. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 31 (2002).
64
FTC, PAY FOR DELAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
65
See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (observing that an
agreement between competitors to allocate territories with no purpose other than to
reduce competition is a “classic example” of a per se violation of the Sherman
Act)).
66
Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 30 (FTC
Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2003/12/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273) [hereinafter FTC Petition for Certiorari].
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firm to stay out of the market.”67 Therefore, the FTC’s rule “would make
almost any settlement involving a payment illegal.”68
On the other hand, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ initially
approved of reverse payment settlements, viewing the payments as a
legitimate enforcement of the patent holder’s rights.69 Due to changes in the
administration and department leadership, in 2008, the DOJ finally adopted
a similar stance to that of the FTC’s, opposing reverse payment
settlements.70 The DOJ asserted that “[t]he anticompetitive potential of
reverse payments . . . is sufficiently clear that such agreements should be
treated as presumptively unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”71
The DOJ further stated that “[l]iability properly turns on whether, in
avoiding the prospect of invalidation that accompanies infringement
litigation, the parties have by contract obtained more exclusion than
warranted in light of that prospect.”72
Currently, the government has a strong cohesive stance against
reverse payment settlements. The FTC, with the support of the DOJ and the
executive branch, will undoubtedly continue to strongly pursue cases
involving reverse payment settlements under its position that reverse
payment settlements are per se violations of antitrust law.

D. The Circuit Splitting Headache that Has Tormented Settlements
The case law regarding reverse payment settlements is definitively
split between patent rights and antitrust concerns. This divergence is
illustrated by the clashing positions taken by the Third Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit on the same reverse payment settlement for the same drug
patent, K-Dur. Three other circuits—the Second, Sixth, and the Federal
Circuits—have ruled on this issue, also disagreeing on the proper balance
between the rights of the patent holder and the importance of enforcing
antitrust law’s purpose.
1. “Scope of the Patent” Test.

67

See FTC Petition for Certiorari, supra note 66 at 18 (quoting 12 HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 339 (Supp. 2004)).
68
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005).
69
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8–9, FTC v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273).
70
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 9–10, Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos.
05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv(CON), 05-2863-cv(CON)).
71
Id.
72
Id.
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The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits evaluate antitrust
claims concerning reverse payment settlements under the “scope of the
patent” test.73 These courts allowed reverse payment settlements as long as
the settlement’s terms fell within the exclusionary scope of the brand-name
manufacturer’s patent.74 Under this analysis, reverse payment settlements
are deemed permissible so long as (1) they do not exceed the scope of a
patent, (2) the patent holder’s patent infringement claim was not objectively
baseless, and (3) the patent was not procured by fraud.75
The courts reasoned that a patent holder could contract within the
patent’s term because a patent grants its owner the right to exclude others
from making or selling the invention by statute.76 Therefore, reverse
payment settlements would not usually exceed the patent’s scope so long as
the generic drug’s entry into the market was not delayed longer than the
expiration of the patent.77 Furthermore, settlements would fall within the
patent’s scope because the essence of the reverse payment agreement was to
exclude generic manufacturers from profiting from patented invention.78
Finally, the courts reasoned that the “scope of the patent” test supported
public policy by encouraging settlements and judicial efficiency.79
2. “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Test.
Conversely, the Third and Sixth Circuits have adopted the “quick
look” rule of reason test.80 Examining the economic realities of the reverse
payment settlement, these courts held that any payment made by the patent
holder to the generic challenger who agreed to delayed entry into the market
was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.81 Therefore,
the parties bear the burden to rebut this presumption by showing that the
73

See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d
Cir. 2005); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066–67 (11th Cir.
2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003).
74
See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1335–36.
75
See id.
76
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin, 544
F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09.
77
See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09.
78
See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337.
79
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976)); see
also In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1333.
80
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
81
In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
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payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offered some
“procompetitive benefit.”82 An example of a procompetitive benefit is “a
modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic drug company to
avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug.”83
The “quick look” rule of reason analysis followed the approach that
was initially suggested by the D.C. Circuit and supported the court’s
conclusion that “[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging
generic firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties
entering the agreement . . . .”84 This test relies upon antitrust law’s scrutiny
of anticompetitive behavior, which stands in stark contrast to the “scope of
the patent” test, which relies on patent law’s exclusionary rights and
presumption of patent validity.85 The Third Circuit justified this approach
by reasoning that it would protect consumers from unjustified monopolies
and align with Hatch-Waxman’s public policy objectives.86 Unlike the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, the Third Circuit determined that
Hatch-Waxman’s intent to protect consumers overrode a judicial preference
for encouraging settlements.87

II. FTC V. ACTAVIS: ANTITRUST NOW HAS A BITE TO GO WITH ITS
BARK
Because of the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in FTC v. Actavis in order to find a middle ground between the two
juxtaposing viewpoints. This section will outline the Court’s holding
and the considerations employed in its ruling. Then, the Court’s opinion
is analyzed for its effective and practical outcomes. While the Supreme
Court’s attempt to strike an appropriate balance between patent law and
antitrust law is laudable, its holding leaves much more to be desired, as
the test it employed is open-ended and leaves the lower courts with a
nebulous path to fumble through.

A. The Supreme Court’s “Rule of Reason” Test
In FTC v. Actavis, the FTC challenged the reverse payment
settlement between the brand-name manufacturer and generics
manufacturer of a synthetic testosterone sold under the name AndroGel as
an antitrust violation. Under the settlement agreement, the brand-name
82

Id.
Id.
84
Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 808 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
85
See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218; In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337.
86
See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217–18.
87
See id.
83
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manufacturer agreed to pay the generics manufacturers millions of dollars in
exchange for the generics not entering into the market for 65 months, when
the AndroGel patent expired.88 This was a classic reverse payment
settlement case where large sums of money were exchanged for the
generics’ delayed market entry.
The Supreme Court attempted to find the middle ground between
the disparate “scope of the patent” and “quick look” rule of reason tests
promulgated by the circuit courts. The court held that the desirability of
settlements is outweighed by considerations related to anticompetitive
effects:
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with
it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or
individual may well possess market power derived from the patent; a
court, by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to
assess its likely anticompetitive effects along with its potential
justifications without litigating the validity of the patent; and parties
may well find ways to settle patent disputes without the use of reverse
payments. In our view, these considerations, taken together, outweigh
the single strong consideration—the desirability of settlements—that
led the Eleventh Circuit to provide near-automatic antitrust immunity
to reverse payment settlements.89

While the Court expressly overruled the “scope of the patent” test, the Court
also did not accept the premise that the payment settlement was per se
illegal or was prima facie evidence of anticompetitive behavior. But, the
Court did accept the Third Circuit’s reasoning that the legality of the
settlement should be measured by “procompetitive antitrust policies,” rather
than “patent law policy.”90
The Court outlined five considerations under an antitrust law
analysis to determine the legality of a reverse payment settlement:
(1) the reverse payment’s “potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition;”
(2) whether the reverse payment’s “anticompetitive
consequences . . . prove unjustified;”

88

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
Id.
90
Id.
89
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(3) “where a reverse payment threatens to work
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee[’s] . . .
power to bring that harm about in practice;”
(4) administrative efficiency;91
(5) the ability for the parties to settle their lawsuit without
a reverse payment92.93
The Court ruled that the rule of reason test should be used as in
other antitrust cases, but also implicitly suggested that the full rule of reason
approach associated with Chicago Board of Trade94 may not be necessary.95
Further, the Court left the decision to the lower courts as to which
considerations to use and how those considerations should be weighed in
applying the rule of reason analysis.96 While the Court clearly overruled the
“scope of patent” test and held that antitrust laws should measure the
payment’s legality rather than patent law policy, it nevertheless created a
murky standard that could deem a reverse payment illegal under antitrust
law, even if the settlement’s anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of
the exclusionary potential of the patent.

B. Uncertainty Will Lead to Inconsistent Rulings
The question left unanswered by the Supreme Court is how lower
courts should apply the Actavis ruling in future reverse payment settlement
cases. All of the circuit courts’ approaches were rejected, and the Court did
not develop any concrete replacement. The Court left too much unclear
with its vague holding that reverse payment settlements should be analyzed
somewhere in between the “quick look” rule of reason and “scope of the
patent” tests. Primarily, lower courts are left with the decision on how they
should use the five considerations and how those considerations should be
91

The Court states consideration four as whether “an antitrust action is likely to
prove more feasible administratively.” Id.
92
The Court states consideration five as whether “a large, unjustified reverse
payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their
lawsuit.” Id.
93
Id. (internal citations omitted).
94
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
95
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
96
Id. at 2238 (“[T]rial courts can structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the
one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis,
and, on the other, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the
minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of significant
unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We therefore leave to the lower courts
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
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weighed and applied to the existing rule of reason analysis. In addition, the
following issues remain unresolved as to how to apply the rule of reason
test: when and to what extent the validity of the patent will need to be
tested, what types of direct economic evidence to consider when assessing
the anticompetitive effects, what indirect evidence will serve as the most
useful evidence of anticompetitive effects, whether market definition will
play a meaningful role, and how courts will analyze potential efficiencies.
1. The Supreme Court May Have Effectively Adopted the “Quick Look”
Rule of Reason.
The majority opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”97 Yet, the
Supreme Court definitively asserted that an antitrust solution is appropriate
in resolving the issues with reverse payment settlements.98 Some
commentators have noted that, in effect, the Court’s decision essentially
accepted the “quick look” rule of reason approach.99 If true, the Court did
not do so explicitly because the Court acknowledges, albeit quite
skeptically, that not all reverse payment settlements are anti-competitive.
Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Carl
Shapiro in Activating Actavis assert that the Court’s ruling means that the
parties to the challenged reverse payment settlement must show that the
settlement leads to earlier or more competition than a settlement without the
reverse payment.100 If the Court’s ruling does force the parties to defend the
reverse payment settlement only by demonstrating the procompetitive
effects of the settlement, then we really are in a world more like the “quick
look” rule of reason approach.101 But, this simply cannot be the case.
Direct evidence of the strength of the patent at issue must be an overarching
consideration. If strong evidence of patent validity were not persuasive,
then the protections given by patents would no longer be as strong as they
have been since the inception of our patent system. Adopting the “quick
look” rule of reason approach would not allow consideration of the fact that
the brand-name manufacturer is risk-averse and would rather settle
litigation than risk their patent to be invalidated. Even when the patent is
strong and there’s little chance of invalidation, the risk of losing millions of
dollars’ worth of profits would give any brand-name manufacturer pause to
consider splitting some of its profits.

97

Id. at 2238.
Id.
99
See Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 21 (Fall 2013).
100
Id.
101
Id.
98
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Perhaps the Court wanted to draw the line in the middle of the
circuit split, but in practice, its ruling can make any patent litigation
settlement appear to be a pay-for-delay whenever the generic does not enter
the market immediately. This could actually harm the consumers, a result
contrary to the Court’s intent, because a reverse settlement in the context of
a strong patent could actually bring a generic drug to the market sooner than
otherwise expected. The generics could be available sooner than the
expiration of the patent when there is a high chance of a validity finding
with a strong patent. Whatever the underlying intent of the Supreme Court,
the holding ultimately leaves the decision to be made by the lower courts.
As a consequence, the uncertainty on how these courts will rule could result
in another circuit split.
2. The Circuit Splitting Headache Still Exists.
The circuit courts clearly showed a preference for the outliers of the
spectrum, which could lead to further inconsistencies between the
circuits.102 District courts may find that their jurisdiction’s appellate court
will “stick to their guns” and rule as closely to their previous holdings as
possible while still falling within Actavis, thereby ruling inconsistently
across the United States. More troubling, lower courts could struggle to
rule consistently against the long-established judicial preference for settling
cases.
For example, the Third and Sixth Circuits, which adopted the
“quick look” rule of reason approach, can apply strong criteria close to a
full-blown rule of reason analysis that would allow the vast majority of
reverse payment settlements to be found illegal.103 On the other hand, the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, which adopted the “scope of the
patent” approach, can apply weaker criteria so as to allow more flexibility
in finding reverse payment settlements legal.104 With different jurisdictions
yielding widely disparate results, generic and brand-name manufacturers
might agree to litigate—and thereby settle—in reverse settlement preferred
jurisdictions and encourage a flood of Hatch-Waxman cases on those
jurisdictions’ dockets.

102

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.2.
104
See supra Part I.C.1.
103
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III. ANTITRUST’S BITE MAY SCARE OFF BAD PATENTS BUT CAN
ALSO KILL SETTLEMENTS, EFFICIENCY AND POSSIBLY GENERIC
CHALLENGES
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to promote consumer
access to low cost generics. “Cheaper generic drugs have saved purchasers
billions of dollars per year—an estimated $1 trillion in the United States
over the past decade, according to an industry-sponsored study—which
makes such drugs a powerful way to keep down heath-care costs.”105 The
other goal of Hatch-Waxman was to provide incentives for generic
manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents in order to clean up the
prevalence of bad patents, which damages society as a whole.106 Reverse
payment settlements arguably bypass both of these goals by delaying
generics from the market and halting the determination of the validity of the
original patents at issue. But, these settlements could also help in the
context of stronger patents as Paragraph IV challenges typically are for
secondary patents: patents that are not for the original chemical compound
or active ingredients of the drug, but for the other improvements of the
drug, i.e. dosage amount. By hindering reverse payment settlements,
generic manufacturers have no incentive to challenge these arguably
stronger patents. Perhaps generic manufacturers would stay out of
Paragraph IV challenges completely because of the increased costs
associated with the increased chance that the FTC would challenge any
settlement.

A. Secondary Patents Are the Major Source of Harm
Brand-name manufacturers attempt to extend the patent exclusivity
of their drugs through the process of “evergreening,” or filing secondary
patents.107 Secondary patents protect supplementary aspects of drug

105

C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339
SCIENCE 1386, 1386 (2013) (citing to a study conducted by IMS Health for the
Generic Pharmaceutical Association); see also GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, GENERIC
DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2014) (estimating that the savings are over $1.5
trillion over the past decade).
106
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984) (explaining that allowing early generic
challenges “fairly balance[d]” the exclusionary rights of patent owners with the
“rights of third parties” to contest validity and market products not covered by the
patent); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2006).
107
See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 959–62 (2011)
(“This practice became known as ‘evergreening’ because the patentee could refresh
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innovation, such as particular drug formulations and compositions, beyond
the fundamental protection of a novel active ingredient given by the primary
(traditional) patent. The rise of the total number of patents is in large part
due to the rise of secondary patents, but unfortunately, they are also
responsible for the increasing number of bad patents.108
While secondary patents do, in large part, provide great societal
value and promote improvements and further innovations, they are less
likely to meet legal standards of patent validity. Therefore, generic
manufacturers target these “bad” or “weak” secondary patents in order to
enter the market before patent expiration.109 Secondary patents are seen as
less onerous bars for generics to entry into the market, and consequently, it
is beneficial for generics to challenge secondary patents under HatchWaxman, to release generic drugs on the market when they are supposed to
be, and to help eliminate bad patents from our system.110 By allowing
generic manufacturers to challenge secondary patents, the system enables
the often-overloaded U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to review
bad patents by allowing for a second look after the bad patents’ initial
approval.

B. Generics’ Entry into the Market Could Even Be Delayed, Contrary
to the Act’s Entire Purpose
Reverse payment settlements, without a doubt, have negative
effects on consumers if the generic manufacturer can defeat the brand-name
manufacturer’s patent; however, this perspective is just one side of the coin.
Often, the brand-name manufacturer wins the patent infringement litigation,
which results in generic entry only after patent expiration.111 Of the cases
that go to trial and do not settle, the brand-name manufacturer wins 92% of
the time when the litigation involves a primary patent and 32% of the time
its stay by periodically adding a new patent to the Orange Book, no matter how
weak the patent or how little it related to the defendant’s product”).
108
Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents:
Developing a Public Health Perspective viii (Jan. 2007) (working paper)
(noting that “in the 12-years period 1989-2000, just 153 (15%) of all
new
drug
approvals
were
medicines
providing
a
significant
clinical improvement”) (internal citation omitted) (available at
http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2008/06/correa_patentability20guid
elines.pdf).
109
Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, 1386–87.
110
Id.
111
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 20–21 (2014); see
also ADAM GREENE & D. DEWEY STEADMAN, RBC CAPITAL MKTS.,
PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010).
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when it involves a secondary patent.112 So, for the vast majority of primary
patent cases and a sizeable number of secondary patent cases, a reverse
settlement payment could have allowed the generic to come on the market
sooner than they would have under the patent life.
Using the Actavis case as the poignant example, AndroGel is
protected by a patent that expires in 2021 and settlement in that case
allowed the generic to be available in 2015.113 The settlement allowed
consumers to be able to access the generic six years earlier than if the
brand-name manufacturer won at trial, and the brand-name manufacturer
had a strong possibility of doing so. AndroGel’s patent was arguably
strong. The FDA approved the NDA for AndroGel in 2000.114 In January
2003, the USPTO issued U.S. Patent No. 6,503,894 (‘894 patent), which
expressly disclosed the AndroGel formulation.115 AndroGel has become a
great medical and commercial success, providing needed treatment to
millions of patients and generating nearly $875 million in sales in 2011.116
Furthermore, the patent in that dispute was not a secondary patent, which is
the strongest argument for support of the reverse payment settlement in this
case. In settlements where substantial probability of patent validity exists
such as the one in Actavis, reverse payment settlements may benefit
consumers by providing the generic challenger with a market entry date
much earlier than the patent’s expiration.

C. Litigation, Settlements, and Innovation Will Be Chilled if Waters
Remain Murky
The murkiness brought on by Actavis may discourage generic drug
companies from bringing Paragraph IV challenges. Moreover, if the
generics still decide to challenge brand-names’ patents, litigation
settlements would be chilled due to fear of antitrust liability as the FTC and
DOJ now have more ammunition to challenge even more agreements.
Undoubtedly, the FTC will express no hesitation in challenging any patent
settlement that has any hint of anticompetitive behavior in the wake of
Actavis, particularly given its position that transferring anything of value
from the brand-name drug manufacturer to a generic competitor should
merit antitrust scrutiny.117 In addition to forcing brand-name manufacturers
112

Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, at 1386–87.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
ABBOTT LABS., ABBOTT 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 52 (2011), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/94/94004/Proxy_Page/AR2011.pdf.
117
See Brief for the Petitioner, FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (Jan. 22, 2013) (No.
12-416).
113
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to defend even their strong patents, the FTC’s fighting power gives brandname manufacturers little incentive to settle cases with generic
manufacturers because the best defense to an antitrust challenge is to
establish the validity of the patent, which can only be established through
patent litigation.
Reverse payment settlements have been a common part of patent
litigation over the last ten years or more, and in the 2012 fiscal year, the
FTC reported there were 40 reverse payment agreements among 140 “final
resolutions” of ANDA litigation.118 Uncertainty could lead to a different
litigation dynamic, in which generic challengers are less able to seek or
obtain settlements that they would consider beneficial to their business.
Further, there would be no incentive to settle if, immediately after settling,
the parties would have to go through the whole rigmarole again and litigate
the same issue of the patent’s validity to defend against an antitrust suit.
Simply put, there is essentially no advantage to settling when the law is
murky. The landscape post-Actavis forces parties to litigate their cases fully
through time-consuming trials, thereby incurring greater costs and risk that
deters rather than incentivizes generic challenges.119
Patent litigation is particularly complex, costly, and uncertain.
Generally, if a patent case goes to trial, legal fees alone will cost each side
$1.5 million.120 But a generic challenging a brand-name patent case costs
about $10 million per suit on average.121 Settlements can provide efficient
resolutions to otherwise lengthy, complex, and costly trials. Reverse
118

FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
UNDER
THE
MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf.
119
See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law,
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1125 (2010).
120
1 H. HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 7.1c, 2014 WL 3738869, at *2
n.6 (Nov. 2013) (But, “[t]oday that number is in excess of $5 million per side.”
(citing Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, 34 (2013));
see also Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IP Watchdog (Feb.
5, 2013) (“[T]he cost of an average patent lawsuit, where $1 million to $25 million
is at risk, is $1.6 million through the end of discovery and $2.8 million through
final disposition”) available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managingcosts-of-patent-litigation/id=34808/.
121
Michael R. Herman, note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1832 n. 41 (2011) (citing MARC GOODMAN ET AL., MORGAN
STANLEY EQUITY RESEARCH, QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT FROM AUTHORIZED
GENERICS 9 (2004)).
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payment settlements provide these same benefits and more. Of the cases
that proceed to trial, the brand-name manufacturer often wins.122 This
means that a reverse payment settlement in those situations would have
allowed a generic to come on the market sooner than they would have under
the patent life. As discussed earlier, in the Actavis case, AndroGel is
protected by a patent that expires in 2021.123 Settlement in that case
allowed the generic to be available in 2015, six years earlier than if the case
went to trial and the patent was found to be valid.124 It is important to keep
in mind that these patents are presumed to be valid in the first place, and “a
valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected
process or product.”125
Given the Hatch-Waxman Act’s reallocation of litigation risk,
reverse payment settlements can be efficient resolutions to the otherwise
lengthy and complex trials in Paragraph IV disputes.126 If reverse payment
settlements are no longer an option to parties, in this time of uncertainty,
cases are more likely to go to trial or generics might not file under
Paragraph IV at all, opting for easier, cheaper, and less risky administrative
alternatives which would cause generics to not be available until the patent
was due to expire anyway. If cases proceed to trial more often, generic
manufacturers’ profits may not be able to cover the continuing legal bills
and brand-name manufacturers may not have enough profits to feed back
into the growing costs of research and development for new drugs.127

D. The Actavis Ruling Could Hinder Settlement Incentives in Other
Contexts
The Actavis opinion has broader implications for the basic
intersection of antitrust and patent law. Reverse payment settlements can
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GREENE & STEADMAN, supra note 111, at 4.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
124
Id.
125
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948).
126
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc.,
677 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing patent litigation as an
“infamously costly and notoriously unpredictable process”); Schering-Plough Corp.
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[t]here is no question
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also arise in the context of patent interference disputes.128 Under a broad
reading of Actavis, any settlement agreement between generics and brandname manufacturers could be subject to antitrust challenge: a lower court
could reasonably read the decision as indicating that any settlement by
which the challenging generic obtained benefits that it otherwise would not
have gained should be subject to antitrust evaluation. This could even
affect licensing agreements, where terms and conditions, especially “field of
use” restrictions, will face greater scrutiny from antitrust review.
On the beneficial side, the opinion fuels support for the FTC to
increase antitrust scrutiny against “patent trolls,” also known as patent
assertion entities or non-practicing entities. Patent trolling is probably the
hottest issue in intellectual property law today, and these entities have an
adverse impact on competition and consumers.129 The Actavis decision
could mean that agreements with patent holders to acquire or pool their
patents would be subject to antitrust review based on two parts of the
Court’s reasoning. First, that patent protection from antitrust challenge
turns “in important part” on “the public interest in granting patent
monopolies [that] exist[] only to the extent that the public is given a novel
and useful invention in consideration for its grant.”130 Second, that
antitrust laws might be violated by a cross licensing agreement among
patent holders even if the patents are valid and enforceable if the patent
holders had “curtailed the manufacture and supply of an unpatented
product.”131 Because patent trolls are in its essence entities that do not
practice their patents, this may be an important tool to curtail patent trolling
by allowing the FTC to ask whether the patent troll, in acquiring rights to a
patent, is furthering the public interest in the “novel and useful invention”
or harming the public interest by curtailing “the manufacture and supply of
an unpatented product.”
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See, e.g., Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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IV. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO MOVE FORWARD
The Supreme Court basically punted and left it all to the lower
courts to decide how to apply its considerations outlined in Actavis to the
rule of reason test in order to identify whether a reverse payment
settlement withstands antitrust scrutiny. This Note will explore how the
lower courts should indeed apply the Court’s rule of reason analysis by
balancing both patent and antitrust values even though the real solution
should come from Congress. Congress can institute legislation to help
clean up the bad patents, which is the entire purpose of the Paragraph IV
challenge in the first place. Furthermore, Congress should realign the
incentive structure in the Hatch-Waxman Act itself in order to close the
unintentional loophole.

A. How Lower Courts Should Apply the Rule of Reason Test
The lower courts are now burdened with the task of analyzing the
specific facts of each case to determine whether the proposed reverse
payment settlement is permissible under the Supreme Court’s rule of reason
analysis. This will be a demanding process, requiring the fact-finder to
weigh the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive justifications.
As explained in the previous section, this leeway will generate inconsistent
decisions and create uncertainty for those parties trying to craft a reverse
payment settlement, or potentially any settlement in any patent litigation
case, that can withstand antitrust scrutiny.
This Note argues that lower courts should focus on applying a
consistent approach in analyzing reverse payment settlements by
implementing a stepwise approach in a “structured rule of reason” test.
This would be consistent with the burden-shifting approach referenced by
the Supreme Court in California Dental.132 Under this analysis, the FTC
would have the burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticompetitive
effect. Once proven, the burden would shift to the defendants to establish
cognizable procompetitive justifications. Assuming the defendant offered
procompetitive justifications, the FTC would then have the burden of
attacking such justifications as pre-textual or a sham. If the FTC cannot do
so, the FTC must show that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the
procompetitive benefits. The FTC can successfully establish that the
justifications are pre-textual or a sham without having to introduce evidence
of the relevant market and market shares. But, in most instances, proving
anticompetitive effects will require the FTC to show a relevant antitrust
market and market shares.
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The anticompetitive effects can be proven by direct evidence of the
settlement’s purpose, but, of course, that would be very difficult to do in
practice. In order to prove anticompetitive effects by circumstantial
evidence, the Actavis Court provided examples to provide the lower courts
some guidance, including the size of the reverse payment, its scale in
relation to the payer’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence
from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of
any other convincing justification.133 The Court further suggested that the
two most important factors from the above list are the size of the payment
and its justifications.134 In the Court’s view, “a reverse payment, where
large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive
effects.”135 An example would be where the brand-name manufacturer pays
a generic “a sum even larger than what the generic would gain in profits if it
won the [infringement] litigation and entered the market.”136 Such a
payment “cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement
considerations” and, therefore, provides “strong evidence that the patentee
seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of
its monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive
market.”137
This stepwise, burden-shifting approach has support from the courts
already.138 Therefore, it would be easy to implement, easy for the parties to
follow because of pre-existing case law, and produce more consistent
results. District courts should apply this analysis as part of a process for
approving the settlement of the patent case, and could employ a special
master or invite the FTC to participate in the proceedings. Determining
antitrust legality before a reverse payment settlement becomes effective
promotes judicial efficiency by bringing the patent and antitrust issues into
a single forum to be decided at the same time, which would provide
additional incentive for both the brand-name and generic manufacturers to
settle and avoid a costly, time-consuming trial.

B. Congress Should Step In to Filter the Murky Waters
Congress originally enacted Hatch-Waxman to promote the public
welfare by encouraging prompt market entry of generic drugs and fair
133
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competition, but the Act, unintentionally, created the incentives for both
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers to settle litigation through the
reverse payment arrangement. Reverse payment settlements have been
described as atypical settlements “that dispose of the validity and
infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman scheme.”139 If this
truly goes against Congress’s underlying intent of the statute, then Congress
must act in order to rectify the current misinterpretations of the statutory
meaning and intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.140
1. Prior Legislative (In)Action.
Congress has attempted to amend the Hatch-Waxman Act several
times. Recently, the Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of
2012 was presented by Congressman Waxman and Congressman Rush “[t]o
prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug
companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market, and for other
purposes.”141 Unfortunately, this bill does not differ meaningfully from past
failed efforts to regulate reverse payment and, therefore, is susceptible to
the same criticisms.142 Congressional attempts to regulate reverse payment
settlements have been unsuccessful due to the feared negative effects on
generic manufacturers, including the significantly reduced incentives to file
ANDA challenges under Hatch-Waxman.143 Congress has yet to strike the
appropriate balance between lowering costs of drugs for consumers and
allowing for patent holders to settle cases within their rights of their patent.
Each of the proposed legislation has focused on the short-term goal of
reducing prices without really solving the underlying problem of reverse
payment settlements because lawful reverse payments can actually reduce
costs for consumers in the long run when dealing with stronger patents (as
explained above) and avoid wasteful investment by innovator companies in
litigation rather than innovation.
In order for Congress to successfully modify the Hatch-Waxman
Act and its progenies, Congress must recreate the incentives for settlement
139
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for the brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. There are many
different suggestions on how to do so, but Congress should focus on the
following three aspects: (1) strengthening the patent system, (2) enhancing
predictability of patent validity disputes; and (3) reinforcing the public
policy of encouraging private settlements.
2. Creating Clarity by Cleaning Up Patents.
A patent should continue to be presumed valid in the absence of
clear evidence proving otherwise. The prevalence of bad patents and the
resulting uncertainty creates costly, drawn out patent litigation. Patents
should be reviewed more closely at the outset, and the new changes with
administrative proceedings under the America Invents Act144 may help to
review patent validity more efficiently and effectively.145 Challenging the
validity of patents through these new administrative review proceedings
promises to be faster and less costly than litigation. The statute provides
that the administrative courts issue a decision within a year of instituting the
action and, in the majority of cases,146 it appears that the board is on track to
make a final determination of validity within about 18 months from the date
the petition is filed.147 Because of the compressed timeline and the structure
of the proceedings, the total cost is estimated to fall in the range of
thousands of dollars instead of millions.148 Furthermore, challenging the
validity of a bad patent in an administrative proceeding should have a
144
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patent system from a first-to-invent system to match the rest of the world’s first-to
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higher likelihood of success than challenging its validity in federal court.
The USPTO uses a lower evidentiary standard when determining invalidity
because a challenged patent at the USPTO is not presumed to be valid as it
is in federal court.149 Furthermore, the USPTO uses a broader interpretation
of patent claims when assessing whether the invention was already known
or obvious.150 The use of these proceedings, especially inter partes review,
has been popular for all of the stated reasons,151 but it is too early to tell if
these changes were successful, and the efficacy and effects of these
proceedings should be evaluated in future publications.
In addition to the new administrative procedures, the FDA and
USPTO could review the validity of patents when the patents are placed on
the Orange Book152 when the new drug is applying for FDA approval.153
Alternatively, Congress could adopt the European system and eliminate the
American patent linkage system of listing relevant patents on the Orange
149
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Book, allowing generic manufacturers to launch “at risk” instead of having
to jump through the Hatch-Waxman hoops.154 This would allow the access
to generic drugs throughout the litigation and incentivize only those
generics that believe they will be successful at trial to launch. This could
result in generics only attacking those brand-name drugs in which they
believe the patents are weak. While these proposed solutions alone will not
help solve the reverse payment settlement problem, it will create more
clarity for patent litigation and clear up bad patents at the same time.
3. Aligning Incentives with Congressional Intent by Adjusting Exclusivities.
The other main underlying issue of reverse payments stems from
the Act’s 180 days generic exclusivity grant to the first generic
manufacturer to file for FDA approval, regardless of whether or not that
generic manufacturer succeeds in invalidating the patent or finding a way to
avoid infringement.155
This gives both brand-name and generic
manufacturers the incentive to settle. The brand-name manufacturer buys
off the first generic entrant, delaying its entry to the market, and prevents
any other generics from entering the market until after the exclusivity
period has expired.156 Meanwhile, the generic manufacturer settles a risky
patent suit and retains its valuable period of generic exclusivity, which is
where the manufacturer can often make more than half of their total profits
on a drug.157 Essentially, both parties get to have their cake and eat it too at
the expense of the consumers.
While Congress purposely gave the first-to-file generic 180 days of
exclusivity in order to induce Paragraph IV challenges to clean up bad
patents, perhaps Congress should adjust the exclusivity approval
procedures. One suggestion is for generics to forfeit exclusivities if
settlement is reached. Scholars have suggested that the first generic should
only be entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period “if it successfully defeats
the patent owner (for example, by invalidating the patent or by proving that
it did not infringe that patent), obtains a settlement that permits entry
154
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without delay, or can enter the market without delay because the patent
holder does not sue for infringement.”158 Another suggestion is for
subsequent generic challengers who are ultimately successful in invalidating
the brand-name’s patents to obtain generic exclusivity. These suggestions
have their issues, of course, but both paths give Congress a start to the
discussion on how to provide incentives that are more in line with the
original statutory intent.
Meanwhile, changes made to the patent system in the America
Invents Act may also be alleviating the current problem. The post-grant
review and inter partes review procedures seem to be gaining strides and
utilization by second Paragraph IV challengers because the two procedures
are much cheaper and quicker than traditional litigation.159 Increased
secondary generic challengers using the new post grant review and inter
partes review procedures could break the logjam created by the first generic
challenger’s settlement. By having the patent invalidated through the
administrative procedures, there would be no barrier to entry by any
generic. As soon as the administrative court rules the patent invalid, the
generic could launch with no risk of litigation. Perhaps we would not even
need to shift the exclusivity incentives built into Hatch-Waxman at all.
Nevertheless, we will have to wait to see the full extent of the results
stemming from the America Invents Act.

CONCLUSION
“[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”160 —
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
The pharmaceutical companies, or rather their lawyers, desire
certainty. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis, however,
very little is certain. The lower courts have a significant task ahead of
them—to agree on how to decide whether each individual reverse payment
settlement violates antitrust laws. Until the legal landscape is made more
certain by consistent case law set by all of the jurisdictions, pharmaceutical
companies may not want to settle at all, or worse, generic drug
manufacturers may find it too risky to challenge the brand-name
manufacturers’ patents. This would undermine the ability for generic drugs
to enter the market as quickly as possible, the primary purpose behind the
158

Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 107, at 949.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011).
160
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465
(1897).
159

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

32

Hatch-Waxman Act. If Congress cannot legislate on the matter, which
could provide ultimate clarity, perhaps the Supreme Court will need to rule
on this issue again in the very near future.

